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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is on appeal from a decision by the district court in its appellate 
capacity. The district court affirmed a magistrate judge's pre-trial ruling denying 
David M. Knott's motion to exclude evidence in his prosecution for driving under 
the influence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Police officer Adam Johnson arrested David M. Knott for driving under the 
influence (DUI) in Ketchum, Idaho. (R., pp. 5, 24.) Officer Johnson took Knott to 
the Sun Valley Police Department to administer a breath (BAC) test. (Id.) There, 
the officer played an audio tape of a warning, and also provided the warning in 
writing, describing the consequences of Knott's refusal to take the BAC test. 
(Id.) Although Knott's suspension advisory form (Exhibit A) is illegible, it is 
undisputed it provided that his non-resident driver's license would not be seized. 1 
(R., pp. 26, 50.) Knott resides in, and holds a driver's license from, New York 
state. (R., pp. 5, 24.) Knott refused the BAC test. (R., p. 24.) 
Following a hearing regarding Knott's BAC refusal, Magistrate Judge 
Walker entered an order dismissing the license suspension. (R., pp. 24-25.) 
Judge Walker reasoned that the suspension advisory communicated to Knott 
1 This can be inferred from the magistrate's decision (R., p. 50), which quotes as 
comparable, the advisory given the driver in State v. Kling, 150 Idaho 188, 245 
P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2010). In Kling. the court noted, "The advisory given to Kling . 
. . directly contradicted the statutory directive by affirmatively informing Kling that 
her nonresident driver's license would not be seized by the officer." Kling, 150 
Idaho at 192,245 P.3d at 503. 
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either failed to accurately state the statutory consequences of refusal, or was 
"impermissibly ambiguous when applied to out-of-state drivers." (R., p. 25.) 
The state prosecuted Knott for DUI. (R., p. 34.) Knott moved to exclude 
evidence of his refusal (R., pp. 35-36), and the magistrate judge denied the 
motion (R., pp. 49-56). Knott pleaded guilty (R., pp. 76-77), but retained the right 
to appeal the denial of his suppression motion (R., p. 76). On appeal, the district 
court affirmed the magistrate court's ruling. (R., p. 142.) Knott now timely 
appeals to this Court. (R., pp. 144-46.) 
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ISSUE 
Knott states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the State in its case-in-chief can present evidence that an 
out-of-state licensed driver refused the evidentiary test despite a 
court ruling that the officer improperly advised him of the 
consequences of a refusal. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Knott failed to demonstrate the magistrate court erred or abused its 
discretion in denying suppression of his breath test refusal because the record 
and applicable case law support that his refusal was relevant and its probative 
value was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect? 
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ARGUMENT 
Knott Has Failed To Demonstrate The Magistrate Court Erred Or Abused Its 
Discretion In Denying Suppression Of His Breath Test Refusal Because The 
Record And Applicable Case Law Support That His Refusal Was Relevant And 
Its Probative Value Was Not Outweighed By Any Prejudicial Effect 
A. Introduction 
Knott's refusal of the breath test was relevant to his prosecution for DUI 
as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The magistrate court found that the 
potential for unfair prejudice from evidence of Knott's refusal did not substantially 
outweigh its probative value, and the district court agreed. On this appeal, Knott 
fails to show the magistrate court erred or abused its discretion in denying 
exclusion of his refusal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in 
its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's 
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely 
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811, 
813 (Ct. App. 201 O); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732; Green, 149 
Idaho at 708, 239 P.3d at 813. Where the magistrate's decision is supported by 
the record and law, and where the district court affirmed, the appellate court will 
affirm "as a matter of procedure." kl 
For issues concerning admissibility of evidence, the appellate court 
applies a mixed standard of review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 
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247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted). First, the appellate court freely 
reviews the legal question whether evidence is relevant. kl Next, the appellate 
court reviews for abuse of discretion, the trial court's weighing of the evidence's 
probative value against its prejudicial effect. kl For this, the appellate court 
considers whether the court below (1) understood its decision was discretionary, 
(2) acted within the scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal 
standards, and (3) exercised reason in reaching its decision. kl 
C. Knott's Breath Test Refusal Was Relevant To His Prosecution For DUI 
Evidence is relevant where it has a "tendency to make the existence of 
any fact ... of consequence to the determination of the action more ... or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.RE. 401. The very language 
of Idaho's DUI law anticipates the relevance of both breath test results and 
refusals. I.C. § 18-8004. It is unlawful to have an alcohol concentration of 0.08 
or more "as shown by analysis of [a driver's] blood, urine, or breath." I.C. § 18-
8004(1)(a). But the state shall not prosecute anyone having an alcohol 
concentration less than 0.08; and anyone who does not take a test for alcohol 
concentration may be prosecuted for DUI. I.C. § 18-8004(2). By refusing a test 
that would either support or preclude his prosecution for DUI, Knott 
demonstrated consciousness of guilt, rendering his refusal relevant. 
The Court must next consider whether the magistrate court abused its 
discretion in weighing the probative value of Knott's refusal against its prejudicial 
effect. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590. 
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D. Knott Has Failed To Show The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Light Of The Record And Applicable Case Law 
1. The Record Shows The Magistrate Court Was Aware It Had 
Discretion And Exercised Reason 
The first and third elements of an abuse of discretion analysis consider 
whether the magistrate court knew its decision was discretionary, and whether it 
exercised reason in reaching its decision. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 
P.3d at 590. The first element is satisfied where the trial court recognizes it has 
a choice in rendering its decision. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 ). As to the third 
element, the appellate courts have not required a lengthy discussion to 
demonstrate an exercise of reason. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600-
01, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333-34 (1989). 
Under Rule 403, evidence may be excluded where "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." I.RE. 403. In this 
case, the magistrate court heard the parties' oral arguments, and considered 
written argument from Knott's counsel. (See 4/25/11 Tr.; R., pp. 38-41.) In a 
written decision, the magistrate addressed the parties' legal arguments. (R., pp. 
49-56.) The magistrate found Knott's refusal was "probative of his 
consciousness of guilt," and concluded that the "[i]mproper warnings about the 
consequences of refusal in a separate civil proceeding do not make that 
evidence so prejudicial that admission of it is prohibited." (R., p. 56.) This 
analysis, although brief, shows awareness of the need to balance probative 
value against prejudicial effect, and demonstrates that the magistrate's decision 
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was reached through reason. The first and third elements of the discretionary 
test are therefore satisfied. 
2. Knott Has Not Shown the Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Weighing The Probative Value Against The Prejudicial Effect Of 
Knott's Breath Test Refusal 
Knott's primary argument is that his refusal should have been suppressed 
for lack of foundation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-12.) Knott acknowledges that a 
driver's refusal infers consciousness of guilt, but contends that admissibility of 
refusal requires that a driver be properly advised of the refusal's consequences. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 4-6.) According to Knott, an improper warning vitiates the 
driver's ability to knowingly, willfully, and voluntarily refuse, thus causing the 
refusal's probative value to be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) In support, Knott cites a district court's decisions in State 
v. Salts, Blaine County Case CR-2003-15090 (R., pp. 43-47; Appellant's brief, p. 
5). The Salts decision is neither binding nor persuasive here. 
In Salts, the district court affirmed a magistrate's decision excluding 
refusal evidence in a DUI prosecution. (Id.) The magistrate concluded this result 
was required under Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 895 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 
1995), which dismissed a license suspension under Idaho's implied consent law. 
Although Idaho's implied consent law requires a driver to be informed about the 
consequences of refusal, I.C. § 18-8002(3), Idaho's DUI law has no similar 
requirement, I.C. § 18-8004. The magistrate in Salts therefore misapplied Virgil, 
and the Court here should reject the reasoning in Salts as unsound. 
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Importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the competence and 
admissibility of a refusal in a DUI prosecution in State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 
309, 328 P.2d 1065, 1073 (1958). There, the court held that a driver's refusal, 
"[l]ike any other act or statement voluntarily made by him ... [is] competent for 
the jury to consider and weigh, with the other evidence, and to draw from it 
whatever inference as to guilt or innocence may be justified thereby." kl 
(emphasis added). Officer Johnson's inaccurate warning did not, as Knott 
suggests, render his refusal inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5.) Instead, 
the inaccurate warning is other evidence for the jury to consider and weigh, with 
the refusal. Bock, 80 Idaho at 309, 328 P.2d at 1073.2 Knott has not shown that 
his refusal is so prejudicial - or indeed prejudicial at all - so as to require its 
exclusion, rather than allowing the jury to make its findings and inferences as 
trier of fact. That the jury may draw an inference unfavorable to Knott does not 
render the evidence unduly prejudicial. 
Ultimately, Knott offers unsupported, unspecific conclusions that he 
suffered prejudice. Absent showing of unfair prejudice that substantially 
outweighs his refusal's probative value, Knott fails to demonstrate the magistrate 
court abused its discretion. 
2 The Bock court also noted, Idaho statutes contain no provision that a refusal is 
inadmissible, and "the courts should not add a limitation which the legislature has 
not seen fit to impose." Bock, 80 Idaho at 309, 328 P.2d at 1073 (citing then-
existence of such provisions in Oregon and Washington statutes). Despite 
changes to Idaho law since Bock was decided, the Idaho legislature has not 
amended or added any provision excluding or limiting the admissibility of refusal 
in DUI prosecutions. See I.C. §§ 18-8002, 18-8004. 
8 
E. Knott Has Failed To Show That Admissibility of Refusal Evidence Is 
Contingent On Compliance With The Warning Requirement In Idaho's 
Implied Consent Law 
Applicable law supports the district court's order denying exclusion of 
Knott's refusal. While drivers may physically refuse breath-alcohol tests, there is 
no legal right of refusal in Idaho. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372, 775 
P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989). The out-of-state cases cited by Knott (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 6-10) are thus legally, as well as factually distinguishable. See Longley v. 
State, 776 P.2d 339, 344 (Alaska App. 1989) (refusal held not admissible 
because made before driver received any implied consent warning); Moore v. 
State, 458 S.E.2d 479, 480 (Georgia App. 1998) (refusal held inadmissible 
where driver was not advised he could pay for additional test by qualified person 
of his choosing, as required by statute); State v. Miceli, 554 N.W.2d 427, 431 
(Nebraska App. 1996) (refusal held inadmissible where driver was advised using 
form previously held to constitute plain error); Janak v. State, 826 S.W.2d 803, 
805 (Texas App. 1992) (refusal held inadmissible absent evidence statutory 
warning was given). 
The Idaho Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a blood test 
result in State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In that case, 
the court quoted a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision disapproving use of the 
implied consent law as a shield "to prevent constitutionally obtained evidence 
from being admitted at trial." Woolery, 116 Idaho at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213 
(citing State v. Zielke, 137 Wis.2d 39, 403 N.W.2d 427, 434 (1987)). The 
Woolery court also cited the South Dakota Supreme Court, which held that a 
refusal does not require suppression of evidence where law enforcement fails to 
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comply with statutory procedures. Woolery. 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214 
(citing State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1977)). The Woolery court then 
held that, so long as a driver's constitutional rights are preserved, the state 
"should not be prevented from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol 
content of the driver's blood." Woolery, 116 Idaho at 373, 775 P.2d at 1215. 
In addition, the court highlighted that Idaho's implied consent law "is 
devoted entirely to the administrative, or civil, suspension" of a driver's license, 
and does not discuss DUI or other criminal offenses. Id. at 373, 775 P.2d at 
1215. As such, the intent of the law was not "to hamstring the ability of law 
enforcement to properly investigate and obtain evidence." kl Citing the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Woolery court noted that, where constitutional standards for 
search and seizure are satisfied, an officer's failure to comply with Idaho's 
implied consent law should not render the results of an evidentiary test 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. kl at 374, 775 P.2d at 1216 (citing 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). 
Although Knott's case involves a refusal rather than unconsented-to test 
results, the Woolery court's reasoning logically applies. Idaho's implied consent 
law was not intended to exclude evidence in a DUI prosecution, but to encourage 
the collection of evidence for the prosecution. kl at 374, 775 P.2d at 1216; I.C. 
§ 18-8002. An officer's failure to comply with statutory requirements for a license 
suspension warrants dismissal of a licensing action; however, it cannot be used 
as a shield to exclude constitutionally obtained evidence from trial. Woolery, 116 
Idaho at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213 (citation omitted). 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that neither Due Process 
concerns nor the Fifth Amendment require exclusion of a refusal, even where 
police fail to warn that refusal could be used against the defendant at trial. South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). Knott has not asserted his constitutional 
rights were violated. Nor does the record support any such finding. Under 
applicable law, there was no basis to exclude evidence of Knott's refusal from his 
DUI prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court below. 
DATED this 8th day of February, 2013. 
D~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of February, 2013, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ANDREW H. PARNES 
Law Office of Andrew Parnes 
PO Box 5988 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
DJH/pm 
~~ DATHNE. HUANG Deputy Attorney Ge:: 
11 
